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Cain: The Right to Privacy Under the Montana Constitution

ARTICLE

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION: SEX AND INTIMACY
Patricia A. Cain*

'What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what
will be done; there is nothing new under the sun." Ecclesiastes 1:9
(my emphasis)
"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are
dreamt of in your philosophy." William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act
I, sc. 5.
I. INTRODUCTION.

What is Privacy? Why is it important? What does it mean to
have a right to privacy? How can we tell when the right is
*

Aliber Family Chair in Law, University of Iowa. This article is based on a

paper delivered at the Honorable James M. Browning Symposium, The 1972 Montana
Constitution: Thirty Years Later, hosted by the Montana Law Review September 12 14, 2002. I would like to thank the Montana Law Review and Professor Martin Burke
for being such wonderful hosts and for organizing such an intellectually stimulating
conference. Comments made at the symposium helped me to improve this paper, in
particular comments by my panelists, Professor Bari Burke, Justice James C. Nelson,
Representative Ken Peterson, and attorneys, Holly Franz and Beth Brenneman. I thank
them and my research assistants, Annette Stewart and Angley Baker, J.D. candidates,
Iowa, 2004, for all their help. In addition, I owe a special debt to my colleague and
partner, Jean Love, who has patiently critiqued many of the ideas included in this draft,
as well as many that were deleted.
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infringed? This series of questions has been discussed widely
amongst legal scholars and philosophers for over 100 years.
Most discussions of the right of privacy begin with the 1890
Harvard Law Review article on privacy written by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis.' Despite this article's import, other
legal scholarship on privacy was slow to follow. In the 1930s,
law review articles on privacy were few and far between,
averaging only 3 or 4 publications a year. 2 By the mid-1960s,
however, more than 30 articles a year were published on the
right to privacy. 3 In more recent years, the number of published
law review articles on privacy is close to 100 a year. 4 Add to
these articles a score of books from the 1960s to the present that
analyze the right to privacy in depth, 5 and one can understand
why the homily from Ecclesiastes came to mind. Surely,
anything I might try to add to this debate over privacy is likely
to be something someone else has already said - "nothing new
under the sun." Yet, there is always the hope of being more
creative and far-thinking than Horatio.
Defining privacy has been, and continues to be, a group
project to which lawyers, philosophers, scientists, and the
common citizen have much to contribute. It is a project that
seeks answers to a number of questions, including whether
privacy is an independent concept with a unique meaning or is
merely an alternative word for freedom, autonomy, or dignity., If
privacy is a unique personal right, then when and under what
conditions might it be trumped by other important rights or
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
2.

INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS, 1931-1934, at 753 (Eldon R. James ed., H. W.

Wilson Company 1935).
3.

INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS 1964-1967, at 667-668 (Mildred Russell ed., H.

W. Wilson Company 1967).
INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS & BOOKS, SEPTEMBER 1998-AUGUST 1999, at
4.
1058-1061 (Richard A. Dorfman ed., H. W. Wilson Company 1999).
5.
See generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY (Rowman and Littlefield 1988); EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
PRIVACY (Transaction Books 1978); MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN V. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY:
THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE (The Macmillan Co. 1962); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY,
INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (Oxford University Press 1992); VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Temple University Press
1991); PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (Ferdinand D.

Schoeman, ed., Cambridge University Press 1984); STEFANA SCOGLIO, TRANSFORMING
PRIVACY: A TRANSPERSONAL PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS (Praeger 1998); PHILIPPA STRUM et
al., PRIVACY: THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945 (Hardbrace 1998); Richard

C. Turkington and Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law (2d ed. 2002); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM (Atheneum 1967).
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interests?
The people of Montana contributed importantly to this
group conversation and debate when they adopted Article II,
Section 10 of the Montana Constitution in 1972. That clause
provides: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the wellbeing of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
6
showing of a compelling state interest."
In this single, elegant sentence, the state of Montana
created the strongest protection for privacy rights of any state in
this country. 7 The delegates at the Constitutional Convention
expressed their support for strong privacy rights again and
again.8 They believed privacy was so important that Montana
6. MONT. CONST. art II, § 10.
7. Prior to 1972 only four states had specific references to privacy in their state
constitutions. Washington's constitution provided "No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
In 1912, Arizona adopted the exact same language in its Constitution. ARIZ CONST. art.
II, § 8. The 1970 Illinois constitution specifically protects against invasions of privacy in
Article I, § 6, dealing with searches and seizures. In addition, Section 12 of Article I
provides: "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation." The South
Carolina constitution, adopted in 1971, protected the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures in a provision that specifically provided that "unreasonable
invasions of privacy shall not be violated." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10. None of these
provisions is worded as strongly as Article II § 10 of the Montana Constitution. In 1972,
the same year that the new Montana constitution was adopted, the Alaska constitution
was amended to provide: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not
be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
Finally, in 1978, Hawaii included a privacy provision in its constitution that borrows in
part from Alaska and in part from Montana. It provides: "The right of the people to
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right."
HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6. See also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 5 (privacy is an inalienable right);
LA CONST. art. I, § 5 (protection against unreasonable searches includes protection

against invasion of privacy); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except
as otherwise provided herein ....
"). In all, there are ten state constitutions that contain
explicit protection against invasions of privacy. The Montana, Alaska, and Hawaii
provisions are the most strongly-worded.
8. See, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS,
Vol. VII 5179-5182 (Montana Legislature 1981),
"...the right of privacy is a right that is not expressly stated in either the
United States or the Montana Constitutions. It is our feeling on the Bill of
Rights Committee that the times have changed sufficiently that this important
right should now be recognized ...In our early history, of course, there was no
need to expressly state that an individual should have a right of privacy.
Certainly, back in 1776, 1789, when they developed our bill of rights, the
search and seizure provisions were enough, when a man's home was his castle
and the state could not intrude upon this home without the procuring of a
search warrant with probable cause being stated before a magistrate and a
search warrant being issued. No other protection was necessary and this
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should offer greater protections to individuals than the federal
government provided. 9 Indeed, some delegates thought privacy
so important it should be an absolute right under the state
constitution. To accomplish this , the delegates amended the
proposal to strike the "compelling state interest" phrase, fearing
that to allow any justification would offer too much support for
state invasions. 10 Upon reconsideration, the phrase was
reinserted, but only because many delegates feared that not to
require a "compelling" justification might lead the courts to
support state intrusions for lesser reasons.1 1
Section 10 makes express in the Montana constitution that
which is only implicitly present in the U.S. constitution.1 2 The
Montana Supreme Court quickly announced its agreement that
Section 10 created a right of privacy independent of the federal
right,1 3 and more importantly, "that the protection it offers is
more substantial than that inferred from the Federal
14
Constitution."
In the years following adoption of the 1972 constitution,
most of the Montana privacy cases arose in the context of search
and seizure. 15 Montana now protects the suspected criminal
certainly was the greatest amount of protection that any free society had given
its individuals. In that type of a society, of course, the neighbor was maybe
three or four miles away. There was no real infringement upon the individual
and his right of privacy. However, today we have observed an increasingly
complex society and we know our area of privacy has decreased, decreased and
decreased... as a participating member of society, we all recognize that the
state must come into our private lives at some point, but what it says is, don't
come into our private lives unless you have a good reason for being there. We
feel that this, as a mandate to our government, would cause a complete reexamination and guarantee our individual citizens of Montana this very
important right the right to be let alone, and this has been called the most
important right of them all."
Id. cited in State v. Means, 177 Mont. 193, 209, 581 P.2d 406, 415 (1978).
9. David Gorman, Rights in Collision: The Individual Right of Privacy and the
Public Right to Know, 39 MONT. L. REV. 249, 250 (1978). See discussion of the
constitutional convention.
10. See comment of delegate Harper. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, Vol. V, 1682 (Montana Legislature 1981), cited in Mont.
Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 438, 649 P.2d 1283, 1286.
11. See Gorman, supra note 9, at 251. See also discussion of this point in the
proceedings of the Browning Symposium, September 12, 2002, Delegates' comments
after paper presented by Professor Melissa Harrison.
12. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Douglas, J., describing privacy as
within the penumbra of other specifically guaranteed rights).
13. State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 497, 530 P.2d 442, 446 (1972).
14. State v. Hyem, 193 Mont. 51, 62, 630 P.2d 202, 208 (1981); Montana Human
Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 439, 639 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1982).
15. As David Gorman observed in his article, "the court.., has not extended the
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from unwanted intrusions more extensively than the federal
government does. Thus, one might conclude that a large part of
the meaning of the "right of privacy" is the expectation that
certain personal facts or privates areas cannot be uncovered or
searched by suspecting policemen. Citing to legal scholar,
Charles Fried, 16 the Montana Supreme Court, in deciding an
early Section 10 privacy case, explained that "[p]rivacy has been
defined as the ability to control access to information about
oneself."17
But the convention delegates understood privacy to include
more than protection from unreasonable searches or the right to
control personal information. Convention documents cite to
court opinions that discuss the right of privacy as the "right to
be let alone" i8 and as the right to choose not to procreate when
engaging in sexual activities. 19 Rick Applegate's Study on the
Bill of Rights, prepared for the Constitutional Convention
Commission, 20 cites to the early theoretical development of the
concept of privacy rights by Warren and Brandeis, 2' to work
done in the 1960s by Alan Westin, 22and to the West German
principle that "everyone shall have the right to the free
development of his personality, insofar as he does not infringe
the rights of others...,,23
Citations to these outside sources suggest that the framers
of the Montana constitution intended to enlarge the scope of the
right to privacy to include substantive rights in addition to the
right to be free from unjustified searches in one's own home
Furthermore, the very fact that the delegates proposed a distinct
privacy provision separate from Section 11 of the Declaration of
Rights, which covers search and seizure, indicates an intent to
protect a concept of privacy greater than the geographical
security in one's home.

scope of the right of privacy beyond the context of search and seizure law in the five
years since the adoption of the new constitution." Gorman, supra note 9, at 253.
16. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482-3 (1968).
17. Hyem, 193 Mont.at 62, 630 P.2d. at 209.
18. Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 522, 241 P.2d 816, 819 (1947).
19. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487.
20.

RICK APPLEGATE, BILL OF RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY No.

10 (Montana Constitutional Convention 1971-72).
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
22. Applegate, supra note 20, at 242, citing Westin, Science Privacy and Freedom:
Issues and Proposals for the 1970s, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1231 (1966). See also ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (Atheneum 1967).

23.

Applegate, supra note 19, at 240-242.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

5

104

MONTANA
REVIEW
Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
64 [2003],
Iss. 1, Art. 5

Vol. 64

By 1972, privacy rights were understood to protect at least
three different types of interests: (1) the right to be free from
unreasonable searches; (2) the right to informational privacy;
and (3) the right to make certain personal decision free from
governmental intrusions. As one commentator has described
these interests, they involve: (1) "search and seizure rights," (2)
"disclosural rights," and (3) "autonomy rights. "24
For the first ten years following adoption of the new
Montana Constitution, privacy rights cases focused primarily on
"search and seizure rights."25 By the mid-1980s, the Court was
faced with a different series of cases in which it was required to
balance the constitutional "right to know" 26 against the right to
individual privacy. 27 In these cases, the Court began to develop
28
the outer limits of "disclosural rights."
It was not until 1997 that a case involving autonomy rights
came before the Montana Supreme Court. 29 The specific
question before the court was: does the right to privacy include
the right of two persons of the same sex to be sexually intimate
with each other in private space where their sexual expressions
have no immediate impact on anyone other than the two
individuals who consent to the intimacy?

24. Jon Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State
Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade Be Alive and Well in the Bayou State? 51 LA. L. REV.
685,691 (1991).
25.
Gorman, supra note 9, at 250. See also Melissa Harrison & Peter Michelson,
The Evolution of Montana's Privacy-EnhancedSearch and Seizure Analysis: A Return to
FirstPrinciples,64 MONT. L. REV. 245 (2003).
26. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9. Providing:
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe
the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its
subdivision, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly
exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
27. See, e.g., Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents, 207 Mont. 513, 675 P.2d 962 (1984);
Belth v. Bennett, 227 Mont. 341, 740 P.2d 638 (1987).
28. Also dealing with the right of privacy as applied to the disclosure of personal
information are Hastetter v.Behan, 196 Mont. 280, 639 P. 2d 510 (1982) (privacy rights
in telephone records); Mont. Human Rights Division v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434,
649 P.2d 1283 (1982) (privacy rights in personnel records).
29. Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997). One earlier case might
be described as a privacy case dealing with "autonomy rights." In Town of Ennis v.
Stewart, 247 Mont. 355, 807 P.2d 179 (1991), the defendants asserted a privacy right in
refusing to hook their residences to the town water system. This right of refusal and the
concommitant right to choose the source of water to be consumed within the home can
certainly be characterized as privacy right in the sense of personal autonomy. The
Montana Supreme Court, however, did not view this particular decision as sufficiently
personal and intimate to be accorded constitutional protection. See infra at n.85
discussing Ennis further.
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The court, in line with almost every state appellate court
that has been asked to consider this question 30 post Bowers v.
Hardwick,31 held that the constitution of Montana did protect
such a right. In rejecting the federal standard set forth in
Bowers, i.e., that same-sex intimacy was unprotected by the
federal notion of privacy, the Montana Supreme Court, in
Gryczan v. State, made it abundantly clear that the scope of
privacy rights in Montana was broader than the federal right.
The decision was unanimous, although one judge, Chief
Justice Turnage, disagreed as to the rationale, basing his
decision on the equal protection clause rather than on the right
to privacy. Thus Gryczan stands as a clear decision in support of
individual privacy rights against state invasion.
In 1999, the Montana Supreme Court again handed down a
unanimous decision based on the Section 10 right to privacy.
Armstrong v. State32 established that, in Montana, a woman's
right to choose how to terminate her pregnancy enjoys greater
protection under the Montana constitution than it does under
the federal constitution. The plaintiffs in Armstrong sought the
right to terminate their pregnancies through the services of a
certified physician's assistant even though a Montana statute
required that all abortions be performed by licensed physicians.
The plaintiffs originally filed in federal court challenging the
Montana statute as a violation of federal privacy guarantees
under Roe v. Wade and its progeny. When the request for a
preliminary injunction reached the United States Supreme
Court, that Court predicted that the Armstrong plaintiffs would
not prevail on the merits and consequently denied the requested
preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs subsequently filed their

30. Supreme Courts in Georgia, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee have all struck
down criminal statutes prohibiting same or opposite sex conduct so long as the conduct
was consensual and in private. Intermediate appellate courts have ruled similarly in
Michigan and Maryland. See discussion of state sodomy litigation in CAIN, RAINBOW
RIGHTS 235-242 (1999). Louisiana and Texas courts have more recently followed the US
Supreme Court opinion in Hardwick to uphold their state sodomy statutes against
attack under the state constitution. A petition for certiorari is currently before the US
Supreme Court in the Texas case. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex Ct. App.,
14th Dist., en banc, 2001), petition for discretionary review refused (Tex. Crim. App. Apr
17, 2002), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3116 (U.S. July 16, 2002). [Note: Texas
courts are bifurcated so that the top court of appeals for issues dealing with criminal law
is the Court of Criminal Appeals, not the Supreme Court].
31. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the United States Supreme Court
held that it was constitutionally permissible for a state to criminalize same-sex sodomy,
even when it occurred between consenting adults in the privacy of the home.
32. 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364.
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challenge in state court. The Montana Supreme Court declared
that the Armstrong plaintiffs did have a "right to choose" the
provider of their choice under the Montana constitution.
Thus, with respect to autonomy rights, the Montana
Supreme Court has twice ruled in favor of extending the scope of
individual privacy beyond that recognized by the United States
Supreme Court. In both instances, I believe the Montana court
has ruled in accord with the "intent of the framers" of the 1972
constitution. These rulings should be of interest to other states
with specific privacy protections in their constitutions. But a
more interesting question is whether or not the expansion of
individual rights under state constitutions should have any
effect on the interpretation of the scope of individual privacy
rights under the federal constitution.
Two questions interest me as I consider the Montana
privacy clause. They are:
1. What are the attributes of "privacy" as a legal concept
that cause some courts to recognize sexual intimacy as within its
scope, while other courts fail to accord protection for such
intimacy?
2. If sexual intimacy is correctly understood as being part of
the core concept of "privacy" in Montana, then what effect, if
any, should that have on our understanding of "privacy" under
the federal constitution?
In addressing these two questions, I will focus on the
Gryczan case and the Montana Court's recognition of a "privacy
right" that protects sexual intimacy. I will first analyze the
Gryczan holding (See Part II) and then explore the broader
constitutional understanding of privacy as it relates to sexual
intimacy (See Part III). Finally, I will make some observations
about the relationship between state constitutional rights to
privacy and the scope of the federal right. (See Part IV).
II. THE GRYCZAN CASE.
In 1973, the state of Montana revised its penal statutes to
decriminalize opposite-sex sodomy, but retained the crime of
"deviate sexual conduct" between persons of the same sex as a
felony, punishable by up to 20 years in prison.3 3 In 1991, the
maximum penalty was reduced to 10 years. 34 "Deviate sexual
33. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-5-505, amended by 1973 Mont. Laws 1360.
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (2001) amended by 1991 Mont. Laws 426.
Alternatively, the person could be fined $50,000, or could be both fined and imprisoned.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/5

8

2003

RIGHT
TO PRIVACY: SEXAND INTIMACY
Cain: The Right to Privacy Under the Montana
Constitution

107

conduct" was defined so broadly that it would prohibit almost
any sexual touching between two persons of the same sex,
whether or not the touching involved the genitals and whether
or not the persons were fully clothed. 35 Under the statutory
scheme, it would be virtually impossible for any two people of
the same sex to engage in sexual foreplay, or perhaps even to
kiss each other, 36 without risk of violating the statute.
The plaintiffs, three lesbians and three gay men, challenged
the constitutionality of the "deviate sexual conduct" statute37
under the Montana constitution. The Montana Supreme Court
held the statute violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy,
guaranteed them by Article II, Section 10.
The result
is absolutely consistent with Montana's
constitutional history and the concern that its citizens have
expressed for individual rights and for freedom from government
intrusion. That history is conveniently summarized in a recent
law review article published in the Albany law review. 38
Yet, the author of that article, William Rava, takes the
Gryczan court to task, concluding that although they got the
right result, the judges got there via the wrong reasoning. The
primary criticism is that the Montana Court relied on United
States Supreme Court cases in determining the scope of the
state constitutional right to privacy. Given Montana's
constitutional history of wishing to grant greater protections to
individuals under the state constitution than under the federal
constitution, the author argues that it is inappropriate to rely on
federal precedent regarding privacy. But that the Gryczan court
did not do. It did not rely on federal precedent; it did not follow
Bowers v. Hardwick. The two federal cases the court did in fact

35. "Deviate sexual conduct" is defined as engaging in "deviate sexual relations,"
which in turn is defined at Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-101(20) (2001) to include "sexual
contact or sexual intercourse between two persons of the same sex. ..." "Sexual
intercourse" is defined broadly enough to cover any penetration of anus or vulva,
whether by penis, other body part, or foreign object. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2101(66) (2001). Thus the statute appears to criminalize not only fellatio and cunnilingus,
but also digital sexual stimulation. "Sexual contact" is broadly defined so as to include
any sexual stimulation of a same-sex partner's intimate parts. See MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-2-101(65) (2001).
36. If the lips are considered "intimate parts," then kissing for the purpose of
arousing the other person would violate the statute. See id.
37. The deviate sexual conduct statute is often referred to as a sodomy statute
since it prohibits the act of sodomy (i.e., anal intercourse) as well as certain other sexual
acts (e.g., cunnilingus and fellatio).
38. See William C. Rava, Toward a Historical Understandingof Montana's Privacy
Provision, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1681 (1998).
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cite are an odd pair: (1) Katz v. United States,39 which is a
"search and seizure" privacy case under the
Fourth
4
0
Amendment, and (2) Palko v. Connecticut, which is not a
privacy case at all, but does deal with the substantive concept of
due process.
Katz is cited for the notion that when individuals have
reasonable expectations of privacy, those expectations ought to
be honored by the government. The defendant in that case
expected privacy of communication in a phone booth. 41 The
government's taping of the conversation and subsequent use of
the tape against him violated his privacy rights. Katz overruled
Olmstead v. United States,42 which had held that evidence
obtained via wiretapping
presented
no constitutional
infringement of the 4th amendment, even though the lines that
were tapped were to the phone in the defendant's residence.
While Katz did concern geographic limits to expectations of
privacy, the Montana Supreme Court used the Katz "reasonable
expectation" test to help determine the substantive, rather than
geographic, limits of privacy. In doing so, the court implies that
geography and substance are not unrelated. Conversations
(substance) are protected within certain reasonable geographical
areas. Similarly, sexual intimacy (substance) is protected within
reasonable geographic areas. 43 The Montana Court's application
of the "reasonable expectation" test in a privacy case dealing
with "autonomy" rather than "search and seizure" appears to be
original 44 and should be viewed as a creation of Montana privacy

39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
41. While in 1967, one might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone
booth, it is not clear that such expectations would be reasonable today. Telephone booths
have changed over time from enclosed cabinets to open kiosks with very little protection
from other people or the elements. See, e.g., JOHN J. DOMERS, TELEPHONE CONNECTION
89-97 (1983) (photos of early phone booths, some with double walls, dome roof, rugs and
lace curtains). Advertisements for early phone booths describe them as "sound-proof."
Id. These old phone booths are vanishing, in part due to vandalism, and are being
replaced by unenclosed booths or phones on open shelves. Id. at 91. See also P.J. POVEY
& R.A.J. EARL, VINTAGE TELEPHONES OF THE WORLD (Peter Peregrinus Ltd.1988).
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (1967); overruling Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928).
43. Patricia A. Cain, Remarks at the University of Montana School of Law
Symposium (Sept. 12, 2002) During the symposium, I commented that while
conversations in phone booths might carry reasonable expectations of privacy, sex in
phone booths might not. I reiterate that point here and stress the fact that while
geography matters so does the conduct. Thus, not all conduct within the privacy of the
home is protected and not all conduct that is worthy of protection will be protected when
it occurs in public.
44. Indeed, other state courts have cited Katz for the proposition that it has
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doctrine, independent of federal precedent. Mr. Rava's criticism
that the court unduly relied on federal precedent seems
misplaced.
Palko, also relied upon by the Gryczan court, is cited for the
idea that the scope of a fundamental right under the due process
clause is determined by asking whether the right is
"fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." The
claimed fundamental right in Palko was the right not to be tried
twice (double jeopardy), a right secured against the federal
government by the Fifth Amendment. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court held that a state had the power to appeal an acquittal and
retry a defendant without violating the concept of ordered
liberty.
Neither Katz nor Palko focused directly on the scope of the
substantive right to privacy, which was the specific question
before the Montana court. The Gryczan court crafted the privacy
definition to include same-sex sexual intimacy without direct
reference to federal precedent regarding the scope of substantive
privacy under the federal constitution. This is exactly what it
should have done, whether it cited some U.S. Supreme Court
cases along the way or not. Its use of the theoretical concepts,
"reasonable expectations" and "ordered liberty," from those two
cases are what is important. Using these concepts, the Montana
Supreme Court is building its own privacy jurisprudence. And
while these concepts may be too general to help anyone predict
where that jurisprudence might lead,45 the flexibility they give
the court is in keeping with the "intent of the framers" of the
1972 Constitution. The delegates intentionally refrained from
defining "privacy," intending for the Montana Supreme Court to
have that power and intending for the Court to construe the
46
right broadly.
Was the court correct in its determination that sexual
intimacy is within the core constitutional definition of privacy?
Are there philosophical or other theoretical notions of privacy,
beyond the KatzlPalko formulation, that support the result in
nothing to do with substantive rights of privacy, and limits privacy protection to a
narrow class of search and seizure fact sitautions. See Shevin v. Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Assoc., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
45. Justice Turnage's concurrence explicitly raises concerns about the future.
Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 458, 942 P.2d at 127. What additional privacy rights might the
court elect to protect in the future? Will the court, for example, include the right to
assisted suicide within the realm of protected privacy?
46. Delegate Campbell, Remarks at the University of Montana School of Law
Browning Symposium (Sept. 14, 2002).
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Gryczan? These are the questions addressed in the following
section.
III. THE ATTRIBUTES OF PRIVACY.
A. History of the Debate.
The question, what is within the core concept of the right to
privacy, has been much debated, particularly by legal theorists
and philosophers.
47
In his 1967 book, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin
begins: "Few values so fundamental to society as privacy have

been left so undefined in social theory.

. .,4

Westin, as a

member of the Special Committee on Science and the Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, spent over four
years working on the challenges that advancements in
technology were likely to pose to individual privacy. Focusing
on arguments that an increase in surveillance of individuals
could benefit society as a whole, Westin turned to psychological
studies that showed the harm caused to individuals when they
knew or thought they were being observed for long periods of
time. "Privacy is not merely a personal predilection, said Robert
Merton, "it is an important functional requirement for the
effective operation of social structure." 49 Utopian communities,
such as those founded by Robert Owen, have often failed
because
"silent monitors" prevented
individuals
from
50
experiencing required moments of solitude.
In the law, "privacy rights" are discussed primarily in the
realm of constitutional law and tort law. Early discussions were
confined to the law of torts since the constitutional right of
privacy was not recognized until 1965. 51 Generally attributed to
an early Harvard Law Review article drafted by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis, the core of the tort concept has been
described as "the right to be let alone." That concept in fact
originated in an early treatise penned by Thomas Cooley in
1880.52
47. Westin is one of the privacy theorists cited in APPLEGATE, supra note 19.
48. WESTIN, supra note 5, at 7.
49. ROBERT KING MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 375 (Free
Press 1968).
50. WESTIN, supra note 5, at 59.
51. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1st ed. 1880).
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In 1960, the "dean of torts," William Prosser criticized the
Warren/Brandeis formulation, claiming that there was no single
core right to privacy, but instead that invasions of privacy
consisted of four distinct torts:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiffs name or likeness. 53
Just four years later, in 1964, Professor Edward Bloustein,
then Professor of Law at NYU, later to become president of
Rutgers University, countered Dean Prosser and argued that
privacy did have a central core concept linked to the idea of
individual dignity. 54 Bloustein argued that Prosser missed a
crucial point about privacy by analogizing the instances in
which it is invaded to four distinctive tort claims.
Intrusion upon one's solitude, says Prosser, is like the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The paridigmatic
case cited in the Warren/Brandeis article to illustrate the
privacy claim was a case in which a mother in childbirth
55
complained about an intruder who witnessed the birth.
Bloustein argues that the woman's privacy right was infringed
whether she experienced emotional distress or not. 56 The injury
is more primary and direct that the consequential distress. The
injury is to her individuality, to her human dignity.
Similarly, the public disclosure of private facts cases, which
Prosser analogizes to tort cases that impair reputation (e.g., libel
and slander), involve a more primary and direct interest than
reputation. Some things are so private they should never be
disclosed by third parties whether they can be proved to affect
reputation or not. Individuals have a primary right to keep
certain facts away from the public, or at least to decide when

53. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
54. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964). The article was prepared for the Special
Committee on Science and Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
same commission that inspired Alan Westin's work on privacy. The original version of
the article was delivered at a privacy conference in 1964. Id. at 962.
55. See De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
56. Bloustein, supra note 53, at 972.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

13

112

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 64

Montana Law Review, Vol. 64 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 5

and how to release them. The Sidis case is a prime example of
the invasion of such a right.57 Sidis had been an infant prodigy,
well-known to the general public, but later he decided to
withdraw from the public eye and live his life in seclusion. The
New Yorker did a story on him, depriving him of that seclusion,
but in no way harming his reputation. Thus, argues Bloustein,
the harm is a unique one, 58 the right invaded is a unique one,
and it is not dependent on impairment of reputation. 59
During the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court handed
down three key cases that expanded the legal understanding of
60
the right to privacy. The first case, Griswold v. Connecticut,
was handed down in 1965. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, held that a state criminal law banning the distribution of
contraceptives violated the constitutionally-protected right of
privacy. 61 The right of privacy is not explicit in the United States
constitution. Griswold was an important turning point in
constitutional jurisprudence because it was the first case to
announce that privacy is a separate constitutional right, derived
in part from other rights, such as the right to be free from
unreasonable searches 62 and the right to keep soldiers out of
one's home. 63 While Griswold located the privacy right in the
intimate marital relationship, subsequent cases extended the
right to use contraceptive devices to unmarried persons. 64 Only
two justices, Black and Stewart, dissented in Griswold.

57. See Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
58. Bloustein, supra note 53, at 977-78.
59. But, as I explain later in this article, invasion of the right does depend on what
sort of information was released to the public. The difficulty for Sidis was that the article
described his personal traits and intimate living space. It is the release of these intimate
details that constitutes an invasion of privacy. See discussion infra pp. (discussing
privacy as intimacy).
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. Laws forbidding the dissemination of information about contraception arose in
the nineteenth century. At the state level, two types of laws were passed, (1) those that
declared printed material about such information obscene and (2) those that banned
birth control. The laws were enacted in response to complaints raised in the late 1800s
by self-appointed purity societies such as the New York Society for the Suppression of
Vice; MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 157-159 (1985).

LAW AND THE

FAMILY IN

Anthony Comstock was the best known spokesperson for these 'purity" laws. In 1873,
Congress passed a federal bill criminalizing the sale or other distribution of literature
about birth control. That law became known as the Comstock Law. See 17 Stat. 598-99
RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRICACY LAW 759-60 (2d ed. 2002)
62.

63.
64.

See U.S. CONST., amend.- IV.
See U.S. CONST.Constitution, amend. III.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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In 1967, in a Fourth Amendment case (the Katz case cited
in Gryczan), the Court held that a defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy when he made a telephone call from a
public telephone booth. Thus information gathered via a
government wiretap invaded his right and was inadmissible.
The important notion in Katz was that "the constitution protects
persons not places," thereby expanding the earlier search and
seizure jurisprudence to cover intrusions into spaces other than
the most private of places, the home and the body. Katz created
a two-pronged legal test for when the right of privacy exists. The
first prong focuses on the subjective expectation of the
individual. The second prong tests the limits of the subjective
expectation by asking whether the expectation is reasonable.
Katz reversed an earlier case, Olmstead, decided in 1928, in
which the court had found that wiretapping did not violate a
privacy right so long as the government agents committed no
trespass and did not physically invade the defendant's home or
office. Brandeis had dissented in Olmstead, explaining:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his
intellect.... They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against government, the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
65
civilized men.

In this dissent, Brandeis articulates the right of privacy as a
constitutional right, the same right he had described in the 1890
Harvard Law Review as a right that should be protected by the
common law. In Katz, the Court vindicated his view of the
constitution. Justice Potter Stewart, who had dissented in
Griswold penned the majority opinion. Only Justice Black
dissented.
Then in 1969, the Court unanimously held that the state of
Georgia could not constitutionally prosecute Robert Stanley
when state agents, entering Stanley's home under a legal
warrant searching for evidence related to gambling activities,
instead discovered obscene pornographic films in his possession.
The Court held that although the public production and sale of
obscenity is subject to state regulation, the private enjoyment of
it within the sanctity of the home is protected. Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, quoted the portion of the Brandeis dissent
65.

Olmstead v. U.S., 227 US 438, 478 (1928).
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excerpted above. 66
Federal Constitutional privacy doctrine as of the early
1970s consisted of two distinct types of precedent: (1) cases
involving geographical distinctions (Stanley) and (2) cases
involving individual decision-making (Griswold).67 In this
lexicon, it should be noted that Katz does not fit neatly into
either classification. Something is being protected in Katz that is
based on considerations beyond geography and yet the thing
that is being protected is not a personal decision intimately
linked to personal autonomy. At the same time, the facts in Katz
exemplify the sorts of concerns many Americans felt during the
1960s because of the government's increased surveillance
activities, as well as the technological advances that made
68
government abuses in this area much more possible.
The Montana constitutional convention delegates did not
explain what they meant by the right to privacy. They contend
that their intent was to keep the concept open for subsequent
elaboration by the Montana Supreme Court.69 Yet, based on the
timing of the constitutional convention, it is extremely likely
that the delegates had in their minds the concept of privacy
developed by Warren and Brandeis, as critiqued by legal and
philosophical commentators in the 1960s, as well as the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s. In addition, the 1960s
had witnessed an increased awareness and concern about
technological invasions and government surveillance. 70 What do
all of these concepts of privacyhave in common? Is there a core
content to the notion of privacy that can coherently and
accurately describe all these instances in which privacy is
thought to be of concern? Those are the questions that were at
the center of the Prosser/Bloustein debate.
That debate continued into the 1970s with new scholars,
some from law, some from philosophy. 71 In 1975, philosopher
Judith Jarvis Thomson argued that privacy does not exist as a
66. Id. at 564, 568-69 (Not all Justices joined the Marshall opinion, although all
justices, even Black, held that Stanley could not be prosecuted).
67. Note that before final adoption of the Montana constitution, the privacy right
recognized and protected in Griswold had been extended to unmarried couples who
wished to engage in nonprocreative sex. See Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
68.

WESTIN, supra note 5.

69.

See case cited supra note 11.

70.

WESTIN, supra note 5.

71. See, e.g., Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275,
280-81 (1974); Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary,
and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976).
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single coherent concept. 72 Although we believe intuitively in
privacy as an important right, Thomson says, "privacy" is in fact
nothing more than something we experience as part of a more
important first-level right, e.g., rights involving ownership of
property or personal integrity. One's right to be free from
surveillance is nothing more than the right to exclude others
from my property and to prevent others from invading my bodily
integrity. Under this view, privacy is merely a derivative right.
Thomson claims that it would be more valuable for us to talk
about the first-level rights and abandon talk of privacy as
though it were something unique that could stand on its own.
She is aided in her argument by the fact that privacy does have
many different meanings, as Prosser had pointed out in his
work. And, despite Bloustein's attempt to refute Prosser's
points, subsequent philosophical discussions about the right had
failed to establish a single all-encompassing definition that was
satisfactorily coherent. Thus, Thomson's articulaton of the
problem with "privacy" struck a responsive chord.
As Ferdinand Shoeman explains, Thomson's attack on
privacy as a core concept is two-fold. 73 One argument is that
"privacy" is not a coherent concept, that the many instances that
we identify as raising privacy concerns do not share any one
characteristic that makes them similar or related. A second
argument is that "privacy" is not a "distinctive concept," that
privacy concerns can be explained in terms of other interests,
such as interests in property or interests in personhood.
Thomson's critique of privacy occurs on both fronts. She denies
both the coherence and the distinctiveness of privacy as a
separate identifiable right.
In 1980, legal theorist and philosopher Ruth Gavison
countered Thomson by arguing that Thomson's reductionist
approach is not helpful to the extent it encourages us to abandon
"privacy" as a useful concept. 74 "Our everyday speech suggests
that we believe the concept of privacy is indeed coherent." 75 We
know what we mean when we talk about losses of privacy,

72. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
295-314 (1975), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 5 at
272-289.
73. Ferdinand Shoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature,
reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 26-28.
74. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421 (1980),
reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 5, at 346-402.
75. Id. at 423.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2003

17

116

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 64 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Vol. 64

invasions of privacy, and legal violations of privacy rights. Some
coherent concept of privacy must stand behind these linguistic
expressions. Thus it is useful for our understanding of the legal
right of privacy to explore what the connection is between the
various contexts in which we think privacy is a central concern.
Gavison's much-cited article is best known for its identification
of three essential components of privacy: secrecy, anonymity,
and solitude. In addition to this central point, Gavison makes a
significant observation about the functions of privacy in a
civilized society. First and foremost, privacy is the thing that
makes it possible for us to live together when we profoundly
disagree about important issues that are central to our
76
individuality, things like religion and sexuality.
In 1998, Stefano Scoglio's book, Transforming Privacy, sets
forth four core subdivisions for the concept of privacy:
1. Physical privacy, which is implicated in search and
seizure cases.
2. Decisional privacy, which is implicated in the
Griswold/Roe line of cases.
3. Informational privacy, which is about who can control
access to personal information.
4. Formational privacy, which refers to the interest
individuals have in self reflection and "critical interiority."
Scoglio argues that "formational privacy" is the most
important dimension of privacy and that it has been the least
developed of the various conceptions. He explains that
formational privacy involves concerns about the invasion of
individual minds by such things as mass media. As an
individual privacy right, we might analogize it to the right to
develop one's self individually, apart from the masses. It is a
central aspect of the right to create individual conscience and
personality, free from external forces that tend to press
individuals toward conformity.
Most recently law professor Daniel Solove, in a 2002 article
in the California law review, has offered us a new
conceptualization of privacy. Relying on Wittgensteinian notions
of "family resemblances," Solove breaks the notion of privacy
down into 6 related areas, six families of privacy, if you will:
1. The Right to be Let Alone
76. See Id. I believe Gavison makes an important point here. Think about this for
a moment. How many times has an agreement to stop the conversation, stop the
argument, been an essential element in your ongoing relationship with: (1) colleagues,
(2) neighbors, or (3) family members?
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2. Limited Access tot he Self
3. Secrecy
4. Control Over Personal Information
5. Personhood
6. Intimacy
Solove is careful to explain that this is not a taxonomy of
privacy concepts, but rather a grouping of notions derived from
how others talk about privacy. In addition, he notes the
importance of identifying whether the concept of privacy under
discussion is thought to be an end unto itself or merely a means
to some other end. In my own opinion, while "personhood" may
be thought of as an end in itself, the other five concepts of
privacy can be thought of as varying means that help one to
accomplish the authentic creation of "personhood." Then in turn,
individual authentic personhood is something that is necessary
for the creation and continued well-being of a free society. All of
these "means" contain some aspect of that thing we call privacy.
If there is a necessary connection between the core of all these
means and the creation of a free society, then privacy is
necessary means. "The right of individual privacy is essential to
the well-being of a free society."
I am not troubled by the claim that privacy is merely a
means to certain valued ends. Neither is Solove. Understanding
the role that privacy plays in different contexts helps us
understand what it is about privacy that we value. And if what
we value is the specific end that privacy enables us to attain,
the fact that privacy may be merely a means rather than an end
in itself does not detract from its value.
Julie Inness, by contrast, believes that it is important for
privacy to be valuable in and of itself.77 If privacy is valuable
only because of what it can accomplish, then its value is
lessened whenever privacy becomes less necessary to the
attainment of the goal. As an example, she discusses the idea
that privacy is thought to be necessary to the establishment of
personal relationships. It is necessary because individual choice,
unswayed by the state or others, is thought to be the best way
an individual can choose a close friend or lover. But then, argues
Inness, what if the world changed so that computers could make
those decisions for us and the computer's decision was just as
good as our own. Then how would we justify the value of
privacy?
77.

See INNESS, supra note 5.
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Inness suggests that privacy is essential to choice and that
there are three types of choices to which we allude when
discussing privacy. They are: (1) information-based choices (we
control release of information about ourselves, (2) access-based
choices (we choose who can have access to us), and (3) decisionbased choices about intimate actions. Yet she insists that to
understand the primary importance of privacy, we must cut
across all these categories and identify what is at the core of
these different understandings.
B. Identifying the Core.
While Solove's and Scoglio's categorizations are helpful in
discussing the importance of privacy, or the general meaning of
constitutional privacy, I cannot resist the urge, as others before
me, to discern the overarching theme, the ratio decidendi, the
core of the thing. In this regard I agree with Julie Inness in her
treatment of privacy in Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation.78 We
79
protect "privacy," as opposed to property or personhood,
separately, for a very important core reason. For me, the core of
privacy is connected with the creation of personhood, the process
by which each of us creates an authentic self. In this regard,
privacy is linked to Scoglio's notion of formational privacy8 ° and
Inness's notion of privacy as intimacy.8 ' To explain formational
privacy further, Scoglio asks us to focus on the harm that
removal of privacy causes.82 Without privacy, one may be subject
to too much surveillance, and then one cannot develop
personality that is authentic. Without privacy, without the
ability to escape into solitude away from the propaganda of the
masses, one cannot develop individual conscience. Without
privacy, others, perhaps even the government, will know too
much about an individual and can manipulate that individual in
order to make the person meet their expectations. Without
privacy we, as authentic individuals, cannot live together in a
civilized society. Or, as the framers of the Montana constitution
put it: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the wellbeing of a free society. ..

78.
79.
interests
80.
81.
82.

See INNESS, supra note 5.
Judith Jarvis Thomson's thesis was that privacy interests could be reduced to
in property or personhood. See Thompson, supra note 71.
See SCOGLIO, supra note 5.
See INNESS, supra note 5.
See SCOGLIO, supra note 5.
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Julie Inness argues that privacy is intimacy and that is
what makes privacy distinct from other values like autonomy.
She also argues that privacy as a fundamental right is coherent
because privacy in all its constitutional formulations involves
intimacy. Griswold, as well as similar cases involving decisional
privacy, was a case about intimate choices and that is what
makes it important as a privacy case. We want individuals to be
free to make intimate choices. Privacy as a fundamental right
protects that freedom. We may wish to protect other personal
choices, such as those made when exercising a right to vote, but
we protect those choices for reasons other than privacy. Stanley,
another privacy case, involved two types of intimacy.8 3 One was
the intimacy of place, the home. The other was the intimacy of
sexual expression, not with another person, but alone. While the
Court did not stress the fact that intimacy might be thought to
exist because of the sexual content of the films that were seized,
the Court did care about the interior life of the mind, another
form of intimacy.8 4 The Stanley Court thought it important that
the materials seized were speech, even though a banned form of
speech, and that the communication resulting from that speech
was an intimate private communication only to Stanley in his
home. Roe v. Wade was also a case about intimacy because it
involved a potential family relationship. The government should
not decide who is to be intimate with whom or who one chooses
as family. Moore v. City of East Cleveland8 5 is another privacy
case in the intimate family relationship context. Freedom to
chose who should have access to me is important, but privacy is
implicated only when those choices are about intimate
relationships.8 6 For this reason, anti-discrimination laws that
force merchants and employers to deal with persons they would
prefer to avoid do not infringe the privacy rights of such
merchants or employers. Customers and employees are not in
83. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
84. The State of Georgia argued that the prosecution in Stanley was necessary to
carry out the state's interest in protecting Mr. Stanley's mind. ("If the State can protect
the body of a citizen, may it not, argues Georgia, protect his mind?"). Id. at 560. The
Supreme Court rejected the state's argument as nothing more than an attempt to control
Mr. Stanley's moral thoughts, a purpose that is "wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of
the First Amendment." Id. at 566.
85. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
86. The Montana Supreme Court understands that not every case involving
decisional autonomy is a constitutional privacy case. Decisional autonomy was certainly
at issue in Ennis v. Stewart (i.e., the choice to not hook up to the city's water system), but
the choice in that case had nothing to do with intimacy. 247 Mont. 355, 807 P.2d 179
(1991).
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intimate relationships with merchants and employers.
The Montana constitution protects privacy of place in its
section on search and seizure87 (akin to the Fourth Amendment
in the US constitution). It also protects individual dignity in a
separate section.88 The separate provision protecting privacy is
either unnecessary because the core rights are protected by
these other provisions, or, alternatively, privacy is something
separate and distinct from geographical privacy and individual
dignity. Indeed some writers have suggested that the Gryczan
court got it wrong, not in result, but in reasoning, because the
more appropriate section, the one that the court should have
89
cited, is the "individual dignity" provision.
While the claim to individual dignity is a strong one and not
unrelated to authentic creation of the self, I believe that
"privacy" was in fact the key right in Gryczan.
Individual dignity is a value that is important in our public
other-regarding lives. 90 The difference between other-regarding
and self-regarding conduct is, according to Millians, 91 the
difference between public and private. Mill's concept of the
public/private divide has been criticized as unrealistically
claiming that some actions occur in spheres that are totally
private. 92 This critique has some validity. All actions have
consequences. Actions that occur in private can affect the public
sphere. Nonetheless, I believe the concept of the public/private
divide is useful in determining where to draw regulatory lines.
Private spheres are necessary for the creation of individual
authentic selves. Within these private spheres there is both selfregarding behavior and other-regarding behavior. The other-

87. See Mont. Const. art. II § 11.
88. See Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
89. The fact that a law criminalizing only same-sex sexual intimacy is on the books
is certainly an assault on the individual dignity of lesbian and gay persons. For further
discussion of possible applications of the dignity clause see Matthew 0. Clifford and
Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana
Constitution's "Dignity"Clause with PossibleApplications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301 (2000).
90. John Stuart Mill distinguished between other regarding and self regarding
norms and behavior. Other regarding norms are necessary for us to live together in
society. Thus, according to Mill, laws regulating public behavior were permissible to
prevent harm, but laws regulating private behavior and our activities and choices as self
regarding individuals were not justified. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
(1869).
91. By Millians, I mean persons who embrace the liberal philosophy of John Stuart
Mill. Id.
92.

See e.g., JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 26-27

(R.J. White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873).
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regarding behavior that occurs in private spheres is different
from the other-regarding behavior that occurs in public. Private
other-regarding behavior is more intimate and connected to the
production of authentic self in ways that are quite different from
the ways in which public less-intimate relationships help
constitute selfhood. I belive privacy is the correct core
justification for the holding in Gryczan because it is about
intimacy, not dignity.
Privacy (and the intimacy that it makes possible) is
necessary for the creation of authentic personhood. I see myself
and change myself in relation to others. If I am not allowed to
make those adjustments that occur from intimate relationships
protected by privacy, I am less likely to create an authentic self.
Pressured by society, I am more likely to conform, to create
myself as others want me to be.
In other words, the "privacy" that government may not
intrude upon is that space, both literally and metaphorically, in
which individuals create self. One very important way that we
create self is through experiences of intimacy with others.
Privacy then implicates intimacy and intimacy is a relational
interest, not an individual interest.9 3 Thus privacy is something
more than individual dignity. Similarly, it is something more
than autonomy. Intimate sex, a crucial part of the metaphorical
space in which we create self, is at the core of the notion of
privacy. The Gryczan court got it right and for the right reason.
So why is it that courts, such as the United States Supreme
Court, who protect the decisional and spatial aspects of privacy
in other intimate contexts, have not understood privacy to
include the intimacy of private lesbian and gay sex? Is there
some part of the core of privacy that they don't get or is there
something about intimate lesbian and gay sex that they don't
get? How can a court reconcile the fact that I am constitutionally
protected if I choose to view obscene lesbian films in the privacy
of my home, but I am not protected if I invite my female lover
into my home to communicate intimately, to be more humanly
vulnerable and real than the women on the screen?
To me, the only possible answer is that there is something
about gay and lesbian sex that they don't understand. Justice
93. While the language of Section 10 refers to individual privacy, it seems clear to
me that the delegates used the term "individual" to indicate that corporations did not
have the type of privacy interests that merit constitutional protection. See Associated
Press v. Mont. Dep't. of Revenue, 2000 MT 160,
45-131, 300 Mont. 233, IT 45-131, 300
Mont. 233,
45-131, 4 P.3d 5,
45-131 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
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White evidenced this misunderstanding when he claimed that
"...no connection between family, marriage, or procreation on
the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated. 9 4 When gay and lesbian committed couples read
the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, the almost
universal response is: "They're not talking about me. My partner
and I are family."
Reading Stanley and Bowers together, the current privacy
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court protects
voyeuristic and impersonal sex, but not real and intimate sex.
This is surely nonsense. Even worse, we have two recent state
appellate opinions that follow Bowers. Within the past two
years, both the Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas9 5 and the
Louisiana Supreme Court 96 have followed the lead of the United
States Supreme Court and found that the enforcement of their
state sodomy statutes against consenting adults in private
violates neither the federal constitution, nor their respective
state constitutions.
Why is the Montana court right and the Texas and
Louisiana courts wrong? Quite simply because of this: if you
allow the government to invade my privacy in such situations,
none of us are safe from future invasions. And the invasion to
which I refer is not an invasion of my geographic space - my
castle, my home. Nor is it an invasion of my bodily integrity, my
person, that I am concerned with. State laws that say the
government can rightfully enter my home (or any other place)
and arrest me for expressing sexual intimacy with my partner
make it difficult for me to develop my personality, my selfhood,
authentically. I will fear surveillance and thus not act openly
and honestly. I will be prevented from developing an intimacy
that will enable my trust of another human being, my partner,
to flourish. I will be more likely to have my mind invaded by the
censors and I will become more like the masses. And if and when
we are all like one another, clones of one another, civilized
society as we know it will cease. "The right of individualprivacy

94. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191(1986). Inness makes this point as well,
supra note 5 at 124-26.
95. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tx. App. 2001) (en banc), petition for
discretionaryreview refused (Tex. Crim App. 2002), cert. granted 123 S.Ct. 661 (Dec. 2,
2002).
96. State v. Smith, 99-2094 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501, 504-5 (discussing oppositesex sodomy); Louisiana Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc. v. State, 2001-2106 (La.
3/28/02), 812 So.2d 626, 629 (discussing same-sex sodomy).
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is essential to the well-being of a free society..."
C. Possible Criticismsof the Notion That Privacy is Intimacy.
1. Line-drawing:good versus bad intimacy.
If privacy includes expressions of sexual intimacy, then why
not other private expressions of sex, such as sex with children or
sex with drugs? If I need help freeing up the creative side of
myself in order to understand new possibilities and to create
new conceptions of self, then why doesn't privacy protect my
choice to experiment with mind-expanding drugs? I think these
questions are fairly easy to address. Arguments that support
including certain activities within the constitutionally-protected
sphere of privacy should be based on clarifying the commonality
between intimacy as I've discussed it and the activity in
question. As Julie Inness has pointed out, the person claiming
an invasion of privacy may have the burden of showing that the
facts in his or her case do in fact pose a question about the sort
of privacy we value, the intimacy we value. 97 And, if society has
disapproved of a particular activity (e.g., sex with children, use
of drugs), then its inclusion in the class of fundamental privacy
rights is at issue. One could not merely argue that free choice is
always good because that is not what is at the core of privacy.
Rather, one would have to argue that the choice to have sex with
children was linked to the creation of authentic self. Such an
argument would have to focus on the intimacy of the
relationship and not just the sex, the intimacy would have to be
one that was beneficial to the self-creation of both parties. Even
if a court was convinced that privacy was implicated,
counterbalancing values would be likely to justify the ban, e.g.,
protection of children, the value of health and sanity that are
threatened when certain drugs are abused, even in private. 98
The only counterbalancing value that courts have identified in
the gay and lesbian sex cases is the value of majoritarian
morality - which attempts to persuade us to be just like
them 99 -not enough, in my view, to warrant the invasion of
97. Inness supra note 5, at 87-88.
98. But this argument re: countervailing values may be difficult to make in the
case of some drugs, notably marijuana. See Ravin v. Alaska, 537 P.2d 494, (Alaska
1974)(holding that personal use of marijuana in the privacy of one's own home was
protected by the privacy guarantee in the Alaska state constitution).
99. Cf. Bob Dylan, To Ramona, on "Another Side of Bob Dylan" (Columbia Records
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privacy, and certainly not a compelling state interest.
Another possible objection to my argument that privacy is
valuable because of the intimacy that it protects is that such a
position leaves the government helpless in trying to protect the
weaker person whenever intimacy goes bad. If all intimacy is
good, there is no problem. But even taking children and drugs
out of the equation, how can we tell in any individual case that
the intimacy is good? Or, if intimacy is generally good, what is
the moral argument in support of that proposition and is it
strong enough to warrant a hands-off approach by the state (i.e.,
no regulation of intimacy) even though instances of bad intimacy
may occur?
While my argument that privacy as intimacy is morally
worthy of protection is not yet fully developed, I can sketch the
outlines of the argument. First of all, my argument assumes
that privacy as intimacy creates the possibility for authentic
intimate human connection and is also a necessary step in the
beginning of authentic social connection. The intimacy that I
describe, experienced with one "other," is where one begins to
curb one's own selfish appetite, one's base instincts, and begins
to value aspects of human existence higher than selfappeasement. If one can lose one's self in the experience of
someone else and then return, one is, in some sense, born again,
with a new understanding of what it means to be human. The
state should foster, not denigrate, the possibilities for such
human connection.
There is no guarantee that all such intimacy will be good,
that there will not be abuses of intimacy. Indeed, the risk that
privacy will be abused is at the core of many feminist arguments
in favor of deconstructing the public/private divide. And
although I certainly count myself as a feminist, I cannot imagine
a world in which the public/private divide has been eradicated.
Yes, we have to talk about the personal, the private, in order to
raise consciousness about abuses of power But I also believe we
have to curb our talk of the private sufficiently to protect the
uniqueness of that intimate space that contributes so
importantly to unique human connection. Finding the correct
balance is the task of the 21st century. 0 0
1964) ("They'll hype you and type you into making you feel that you gotta be just like
them.").
100. A new concept of the public/private divide is needed that will take into account
individualistic notions of privacy (e.g., John Stuart Mill) and feminist notions that
valuing privacy merely maintins patriarchal power relationships. See generally,
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2. Privacy is merely a form of liberty.
Some theorists have described privacy as a form of liberty.
While there is a certain family resemblance between the two, it
seems to me that they are separate and distinct concepts. One
can imagine a prisoner lacking liberty, but enjoying a relatively
high degree of privacy. At the same time one can imagine a
public figure enjoying quite a bit of freedom, but very little
privacy. Linguistically at least, such formulations appear
sensible.
Liberty, in the form of a constitutional right, has come to be
thought of in the United States as the right to negative liberty.
Political theorists such as Isaiah Berlin and John Stuart Mill
have argued that the only sort of liberty a state should provide
its citizens is negative liberty. 0 1 For the state to become
involved in the provision of positive or substantive goods might
result in excessive state involvement in determining what does
or does not constitute the good life. Liberal political theory
requires that the state remain neutral on this question. Thus,
the state is not required to provide any social, material, or
political good other than individual freedom, which, so the
argument goes, is fully protected by the state's guarantee of
negative rights.
Returning to the various categories that have been used to
describe privacy, reconsider Professor Solove's list. The first four
conceptual categories identified by Professor Solove (i.e., the
right to be let alone, limited access to self, secrecy, and control
over personal information) clearly implicate notions of negative
liberty. By this I mean the right of privacy is conceptualized as a
private sphere in which I, as an individual, have a liberty
interest and the state (or other individuals in the form of
tortfeasors) are not permitted by the law to interfere with my
sphere.
The "right to be let alone" includes the right to decide
whether to use contraceptives when I engage in sexual intimacy.

CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 92-103 (1987) . I have attempted to

shift the focus slightly in this article from the Millian notion that self-regarding norms
are confined to private spheres and other-regarding norms to public spheres. In my view,
other-regarding norms are also part of the private sphere. New concepts are created out
of conflict. Thus, in time, as feminists criticize the traditional notions of privacy and the
private sphere, new concepts will emerge. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (Rowman & Littlefield 1988).

101. See, Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118
(1969); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16-17 (Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1956).
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This is a negative liberty because the state is asked to stay
uninvolved, to do nothing. If I can't afford contraception, the
state is not required to provide contraception. That would
implicate a notion of positive liberty. "Limited access to the self,"
Solove's second conception of privacy, similarly involves a
negative liberty.
Negative liberty is also at the core of my right to "secrecy"
and "control over release of personal information," Solove's third
and fourth conceptions, although positive liberty might be
implicated if I should desire positively to release my story as a
self-creating event and I had no means of doing so on my own.
"Personhood," Solove's fifth conception is derived from Paul
Freund's notion that "personhood" includes "those attributes of
an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood."10 2 This
concept of privacy is more in line with the core content I have
sought to identify. Privacy is necessary to the process of
becoming a self, differentiated from other selves. Here, I am not
talking merely about private space in a geographical sense, e.g.,
a room of one's own, although that too is important. Rather I
mean the private intangible space where individual conscience
is constructed and nurtured.
As I have outlined my argument that privacy is intimacy, I
have shown the connection between "personhood" and intimacy.
Privacy is necessary to the creation of intimacy. Intimacy is
necessary for full development of individual personality, because
I must experience self as connected with another, yet at the
same time separate from others. While I include sexual intimacy
within this concept, I mean to include other intimacies as well.
Forms of religious intimacy, for example, often connect us to
other human beings in a shared experience of God, or with the
"ground of all being,"10 3 or create shared spiritual connections
with nature.
Borrowing from existential philosophy, I suggest that
personhood and intimacy are necessary
for full human
development. One cannot be fully human if one does not
understand one's separateness from others and yet, the moment
one does understand that separateness, one yearns for a
connection that will end the separation. One yearns for a certain
degree of intimacy.
Negative liberty certainly plays a role in the development of

102.
103.

Daniel J. Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2002).
See P. TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 235 (1951).
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personhood and intimacy. Negative liberty includes the right to
be free from government intrusion and government regulation or in the words of Warren and Brandeis, the "right to be let
alone."
Are the rights connected with personhood and intimacy
merely examples of reasons why we wish to be let alone, i.e., to
be let alone in order to more independently develop self and
intimacy? Or do personhood and intimacy implicate something
further? If private space is required - a room of my own, as it
were, in order to create a mind of my own - then is it not at least
arguable that the state should play its part in seeing to it that
we all have a room of our own? If solitude, an element of privacy,
is necessary for individuality and individuality is necessary for
the continuation of civilization as we know it, then the state
should do its part in seeing that we all have solitude. Being left
alone by government is not sufficient. Warren and Brandeis, the
guys who started this quest for the meaning of privacy, were
concerned about relief from the prying eyes of neighbors. Tort
law is one way to protect privacy. But today, now that the world
is more crowded, more noisy, we have trouble finding solitude
even when we escape the nosey neighbors. In this world, we
should begin to think of the positive obligations that we might
appropriately demand of government to help us find the
solitude, the privacy, that is necessary, indeed "essentialto the
10 4
well-being of a free society."
Privacy, as I have conceived it, implicates both negative and
positive rights. Intimacy must be made possible by both
restraining government (i.e., negative liberty) and by requiring
positive protection for intimacy (i.e., positive liberty). Whether
privacy is the same as liberty is irrelevant for my purposes. The
important thing is that privacy as intimacy be guaranteed and
protected under the law.
IV. GRYCZAN'S IMPACT ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO PRIVACY.

It is hornbook law that the United States Supreme Court is
the final arbiter of the meaning of the United States
Constitution and that state supreme courts have the same
position
of interpretive
power regarding their state
constitutions. An increasing number of civil rights lawyers,
104. Laws aimed at protecting personal privacy have been enacted since the 1960's.
See, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 522a.
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fighting for the expansion of individual rights, have been
turning to the state courts over the last 20 years, heeding
Justice Brennan's advice that state courts might prove more
supportive. 1 5 And, in many cases, the state courts have lived up
to those expectations. This has been particularly true in the case
10 6
of lesbian and gay rights.
While the United States Supreme Court has found that
privacy does not include same-sex sexual intimacy, should it
make a difference that state supreme courts have found that
state constitutions do protect same-sex sexual intimacy? This
question could not be more timely, given the Supreme Court's
decision to review the same-sex sodomy case from Texas. The
Court's grant of certiorari indicates a willingness to rethink its
privacy jurisprudence and perhaps reverse Bowers v. Hardwick.
At the same time, the Texas case might also be decided on equal
protection grounds with little attention given to a
reconsideration of privacy norms. In my view, the privacy
jurisprudence developed in Gryczan and similar state court
rulings is relevant to the issue currently before the United
States Supreme Court. When thinking about this point, one
should view the federal-state constitutional relationship in
historical context. During the years of the Warren Court, federal
constitutional
protections
increased
individual
rights
1
0
7
particularly in the area of race relations
and criminal
justice. 0 8 Because federal law is superior to state law, this
increase in individual rights at the federal level served to
increase an individual's rights against state governments as
well.
This increase in rights had not always been the case. For
example, in search and seizure law, federal supremacy did not
increase individual rights at the state level until the Court
105. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986);
William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
106. The California Supreme Court found a violation of the state constitution's
equality provision in a gay rights case as early as 1979. Gay Law Students Assoc. v. Pac.
Tel & Tel, 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). Post Bowers v. Hardwick, many state courts have
struck down consensual sodomy statutes under a state constitution.
See, e.g.
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250 (Tenn Ct. App. 1996), Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Jegley v.
Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); and, of course Gryczan.
107. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
108. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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decided to apply federal standards in determining the
constitutionality of searches conducted by state officers. 10 9 In
1949, the Court had held that when state officials obtained
evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment principle
against unreasonable searches (applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause), 110 the federal
exclusionary rule did not apply.'1 1 Thus such tainted evidence
could be used to convict the defendant in state court even though
it could not be so used had it been obtained by federal agents
and used in a federal trial. 112 But with the Warren Court this
phenomenon of greater federal protection/lesser state protection
ceased. An increase of individual rights at the federal level
meant that rights at the state level were similarly increased.
When the Burger Court ceased expanding individual rights
against government, the view of the relationship between
federal and state constitutions changed. As a result, the current
view of the relationship between federal and state constitutional
law has became one in which the federal constitution creates a
floor for the protection of individual rights against government
intrusion. 113 In that case, states can ratchet up the protection,
109. Id.
110. The Court applied federal constitutional standards to the states through the
incorporation doctrine, a doctrine which incrorporated the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause of the 14th amendment and thus applied those principles to prevent the
states from infringing the same individual rights that the federal government was
prevented from infringing. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 567-572 (1978).
111. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
112. This difference in the strength at the state and federal levels of the individual's
right against unreasonable searches led to the creation of the "silver platter" doctrine.
Under the "silver platter" doctrine, since evidence obtained by state officers, even if
obtained in an illegal search, was admissible, state agents could turn the evidence over
to federal agents "on a silver platter" and the evidence would be admissible in the federal
trial. In 1960, the United States Supreme Court abolished the "silver platter" doctrine,
holding that evidence is inadmissible in a federal trial if it is acquired by a state officer
in violation of federal search and seizure standards. See Elkins v. U..S., 364 U..S. 206
(1960). In 1961, the exclusionary doctrine was applied to the states so that no
constitutionally-tainted evidence could be used in a state trial. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
Today the conflict between federal and state constitutional protections arises when a
state officer violates a state constitution which offers more protection than the federal
constitution and then turns the evidence over to a federal agent for prosecution in a
federal trial. The federal court will not exclude the evidence even though the state could
would have done so. This set of facts creates a "reverse silver platter" situation. While
there may be something troubling about state agents who avoid state constitutions by
handing evidence over to a federal prosecutor, apparently the procedure raises no federal
constitutional issues. See John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization
of Local Crime, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 673, 703-704 (1999).
113. This argument for the expansion of state constitutional rights "above the floor"
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but they can never ratchet it down. Of course the explanation for
why states can never ratchet down the protection of individual
rights is that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to them and
prevents the states from according less protection than the
federal constitution commands, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court. Thus, every individual, no matter what
the state of residence or of temporary repose, has a uniform
"floor" of protection against all governments.
In this context, it is interesting that the Montana Supreme
Court cites Palko for the notion that a fundamental right is one
that is rooted in the concept of ordered liberty. Palko of course
used that notion to deny Frank Palko, the petitioner in that
case, protection against the state's decision to subject him to
double jeopardy, 114 a right guaranteed by the federal
constitution and interpreted in a way that gave stronger
protections than the state law protection against double
jeopardy. Thus the facts in Palko involved a case in which the
higher federal protection was not available to Mr. Palko in the
state of Connecticut. Palko was reversed 32 years later by
Benton v. Maryland,115 in which the Court explained:
Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights which
this Court's recent decisions have rejected ..... Our recent cases
have thoroughly rejected the Palko notion that basic constitutional
rights can be denied by the States as long as the totality of the
circumstances does not disclose a denial of 'fundamental fairness.'
Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,'... the same
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal
Governments. Palko's roots had thus
been cut away years ago. We
1 16
today only recognize the inevitable.

Today the role of the Supreme Court in protecting
individual rights against state intrusion is clear. Once the
Unites States Supreme Court determines that a right is
was the primary message in a number of articles during the era of the Burger Court. See
Brennan supra note 86 at 39. See also Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L. J. 421, 425
(1974); and Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1985).
114. Palko (1937) was tried for first degree murder and found guilty of second
degree murder. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The state appealed asking for
the opportunity to try Palko again for first degree murder and the court allowed the
second trial. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed and held that the
individual right to not be tried twice for the same crime was not sufficiently rooted in our
concept of ordered liberty. Id.,at 328.
115. 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
116. Id. at 794-95.
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fundamental, it will be fundamental on both federal soil as well
as the soil of all 50 states. Yet, it seems to me that a question of
fundamental fairness arises when an individual's protection in
something as important as personal intimacy can change
significantly merely by the crossing of a state line. Indeed, if
most states (and arguably all but two) 117 protect that intimacy,
surely we come to expect that our interests in intimacy will be
protected by the law. 118 At some point, the notion of
fundamental fairness requires that individual rights be
ratcheted up to the prevailing level, especially in cases where
the increased protection causes virtually no harm to anyone
else's right other than the right to state a moral code publicly.
The question that arises because of the new relationship
between federal and state constitutions is whether the
supremacy clause, or indeed the very structure of federalism
prevents the United States Supreme Court from listening to and
learning from the constitutional jurisprudence created in state
courts. 119
Our system of federalism is defended in a number of
different ways. One claim is that it is better to make decisions at
the local level because the government that is closer to the
governed knows best how to govern. 120 Another claim is that we
need the freedom to experiment amongst the fifty states with
different ways of addressing problems. 121 Presumably the more
trial and error we experience as a nation, the more certain we
can be that we have the right solution in the end. While this
argument has been primarily used to justify restraints on
Congressional action that would usurp the abilities of states to
conduct their affairs differently, the argument can also be cited
as support for a dialogue between the state and federal courts on

117.
Louisiana and Texas, because in those two states appellate courts have
recently reaffirmed the constitutionality of the sodomy statutes.
118. One might have made the same argument about the exclusionary rule. At the
time the Court decided against recognizing the exclusionary rule as fundamental and
thus applicable to the states, more than two-thirds of the states were opposed to the rule.
By the time the Court decided in Mapp to reverse itself, over half the states had adopted
the rule on their own. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. Thus, notions of fundamental fairness
at the state level are not irrelevant to notions at the federal level.
119. But see, Id.
120. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 391. See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Does Federalism Advance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 911 (2001).
121. This "states as laboratories" argument is credited to Justice Brandeis in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
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the question of individual rights. 122 When the United States
Supreme Court failed to protect the private intimacy of same-sex
couples in Bowers v. Hardwick, it left the question open for the
states. At some point, it would seem to be the responsibility of
that Court to say that enough experimentation has occurred.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has made a similar point in
123 If
the context of federalism's limits on Congressional power.
the states are left to experiment and that is a value in and of
itself, who is to decide when the experiments are complete? If
only Texas and Louisiana are left with valid statutes
criminalizing same-sex sexual intimacy, is it perhaps time for
the United States Supreme Court to enforce a new federal
standard of privacy that will make us one nation again?
The state of Montana is fortunate to have elected judges,
presumably close to the people, who understand the need for
individual privacy and understand the role of intimate sexual
relationships in creation of selfhood. The state of Montana is
fortunate to have a Supreme Court that does not blindly follow
the dictates of the United States Supreme Court. It is time for
the United States Supreme Court to listen and to learn from the
Supreme Court of Montana.

122. See Chemerinsky, supra note 118 at 928, pointing out that the "key questions
are, when is it worth experimenting and when is experimentation to be rejected because
of a need to impose a national mandate? The value of states as laboratories provides no
answer to this issue."
123. See Id.,at 928-29, stating:
There also is a related process question: who is in the best position to decide
when further experimentation is warranted or when there is enough
knowledge to justify federal actions? A strong argument can be made that the
need for using states as laboratories is a policy argument to be made to
Congress against federal legislation and not a judicial argument that should be
used to invalidate particular federal laws on the grounds that they unduly
limit experimentation.
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